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OBSERVATION
UNIFORM TIMING OF PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARIES
EUGENE GRESSMAN-t
The United States Constitution says nothing about political parties or pri-
mary elections. It does not provide any nominating procedures for President
and Vice President outside those provisions dealing with the Electoral College.
Nor has Congress ever attempted to regulate the timing or procedures of the
Presidential nominating process.
Various informal nominating devices have been developed in the past to fill
this void. Such devices have included congressional caucuses, state-based legis-
lative systems, and national political party conventions. The first two devices
were abandoned long ago; the convention process, instituted in 1840, has sur-
vived, but has suffered from nonuniformity in delegate selection procedures and
from minimal participation by rank-and-file party members.' Early in the twen-
tieth century a movement began to reform the Presidential nominating process
by instituting Presidential primaries. Florida established the first such primary
in 1904, followed by Wisconsin in 1905 and Pennsylvania in 1906. By 1984, the
most recent Presidential election year, thirty-three states as well as the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico held some form of Presidential primary. 2
The flowering of the state-run Presidential primary system has not been
without problems. States now compete to hold the earliest primary, which re-
sults in an ever-lengthening primary election period and increased costs and
strains on the candidates. There are many other differences and variations in the
manner of selecting and binding delegates to party conventions, ranging from
elections to caucuses to mini-conventions. Some primaries, nonbinding in na-
ture, serve only to reflect voter preferences for the Presidency.
There is one element in this Presidential nominating cacophony that Con-
gress clearly has constitutional power to control. That element is the timing of
Presidential primaries and caucuses, at least to the extent that such processes
represent state action. Bills have been introduced in the 99th Congress that
would establish a uniform and limited period of time in which states may hold
primaries or other means of selecting candidates for the highest office in the
t William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law. This Observation is drawn from a written statement submitted by Professor Gress-
man to the Subcommittee on Elections of the House of Representatives Committee on House Ad-
ministration at a May 8, 1986, hearing on the Presidential nominating process.
1. Presidential Nominating Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm.
on House Administration, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Thomas M. Durbin, Legislative Attorney of the Congressional Research Service).
2. Id. at 166.
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land. In my judgment, congressional control of the timing of such nominating
processes is consistent with the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
Primarily, I shall address only one of the four proposals pending before
Congress, the Udall Bill, 3 which proposes a nationally uniform ninety-day pe-
riod in which to hold such primaries and caucuses. The other three bills would
divide the nation into designated regions and allocate to each region a certain
date within the ninety-day period on which to hold Presidential primaries and
caucuses. 4 I do not believe that such a regional feature either adds to or sub-
tracts from the constitutional considerations at stake in the Udall proposal. Ac-
cordingly, I concentrate here on the power of Congress in an election year to
limit the period of time during which various states may hold Presidential
primaries and caucuses.
The essence of the Udall proposal is that a presidential primary "may only
be held" in the year of a presidential election and "during the period beginning
on the second Tuesday in March and ending on the second Tuesday in June" of
such year.5 The Bill then defines the term "presidential primary" as "a primary,
caucus, convention, or other means of selecting a candidate for the Office of the
President of the United States, except that such term does not mean a national
nominating convention of a political party."' 6 Finally, the Bill authorizes the
Attorney General of the United States to institute "any civil action for injunctive
relief as may be appropriate to assure compliance with this Act."'7
In explaining his proposal before the Task Force on Elections in 1984, Rep-
resentative Udall explained:
This bill would simply limit the selection of delegates to national
nominating conventions to a 90-day period beginning with the second
Tuesday in March and ending the second Tuesday in June. That is all
it does. It does not overhaul the Presidential primary system; it does
not violate the constitutional prerogatives of the States and parties to
determine how to select Presidential nominees.
It would make two small but important changes in the way we
choose our Presidential candidates. First, the primary season would be
limited to a specific period of time, eliminating the disproportionate
influence of a few early primary States. Second, a shorter primary sea-
son would reduce the amount of campaign spending and relieve, to
some extent, the boredom factor that is experienced by many vote[r]s
over a prolonged campaign.8
3. H.R. 1380, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). Representative Udall submitted an identical bill in
the 98th Congress, H.R. 6054, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), on which the Task Force on Elections of
the Committee on House Administration held hearings on September 19, 1984. See Presidential
Primaries: Hearings on H.R. 6054 Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House
Administration, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Task Force Hearings].
4. The three regional-type proposals are the Bennett Bill, H.R. 251, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1985); the Nelson Bill, H.R. 3542, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); and the Levin Bill, H.R. 4453, 99th
Cong., 31st Sess. (1986). A copy of all four bills may be found in Hearings, supra note 1, at 2-18.
5. H.R. 1380, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1985).
6. Id.§2.
7. Id. § 3.
8. Task Force Hearings, supra note 3, at 6.
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A co-sponsor of the Udall Bill, Representative Conte, has further stated that
"this legislation does address three negative aspects of the Presidential selection
process: The exaggerated role of the early primaries, the length of the campaign,
and the cost of the campaign."9
The proposed legislation is fully consonant with the principles and provi-
sions of the Constitution. It represents an exercise of congressional power to
enact laws deemed "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the
vested power of Congress to "determine the Time of chusing the [Presidential]
Electors." 10 It invades no exclusive power of the states; indeed, the states have
neither the power nor the capacity to determine what is necessary to implement
this timing determination. Nor does the proposed legislation, which deals only
with the timing of the primaries and caucuses that lead to the choosing or elec-
tion of the electors, implicate any First Amendment rights of speech or associa-
tion that may attach to political parties or individual voters.
The Constitution deals with the timing of federal elections in only two re-
spects: (1) article I, section 4 gives Congress power to regulate the "Times," as
well as the "Places and Manner," of holding elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives;1 1 (2) article II, section 1, clause 4 vests in Congress the power to
determine "the Time of chusing the [Presidential] Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the
United States."' 12
We are concerned here, of course, only with the latter provision, "the Time
of chusing the [Presidential] Electors." But it is significant that the Framers,
when dealing with the time for electing either the Congress or the electors, gave
the final power over time selection not to the states but to Congress-the one
body capable of assuring any degree of uniformity among the states in the timing
of federal elections. In addition, the reference in article II, section 4 to the day
for casting the votes of the electors as "the same throughout the United States"
is some indication that the Framers recognized the need for national uniformity
in setting the time for selecting a President.
The article II reference to the time of choosing Presidential electors does
not address specifically the modern phenomenon of state primaries and caucuses
that precede the selection and formation of the electoral college. We therefore
must assume, as the Supreme Court in United States v. Classic 1 3 assumed with
respect to the primary elections that precede congressional elections, that the
9. Task Force Hearings, supra note 3, at 8.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
11. Id. art. I, § 4. Pursuant to that vested authority, Congress has provided: "The Tuesday
next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for
the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Dele-
gates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter." 2 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
The time for election of Senators is directly related to the time for electing Representatives. Id. § 1.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Congress has provided that "The Electors of President and Vice
President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November,
in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President." 3 U.S.C. § 1
(1982). As to the day on which Electors vote, see id. § 7.
13. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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Framers "did not have specifically in mind the selection and elimination of can-
didates for [the Presidency or the electors] by the direct primary any more than
they contemplated the application of the commerce clause to interstate tele-
phone, telegraph and wireless communication, which are concededly within
it."' 14 But, as the Classic opinion continued,
in determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a
new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which
the framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring frame-
work of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite fu-
ture and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those
fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we
read its words, not as we read legislative codes which are subject to
continuous revision with the changing course of events, but as the reve-
lation of the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the
Constitution as a continuing instrument of government.... If we re-
member that "it is a Constitution we are expounding," we cannot
rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words, that which will
defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose.1 5
The Classic Court read article I, section 4 in conjunction with article I,
section 2, which states that members of the House shall be "chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States." 1 6 Read together, these sections reveal
one of "the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the Constitu-
tion as a continuing instrument of government."' 17 That purpose, said the
Court, is to secure "a free choice of representatives by the people [by authoriz-
ing] Congress to regulate the manner of [such] elections."' 8 Thus, when a state,
exercising its privilege in the absence of congressional action, changes the mode
of choice from a single step (a general election) to a two-step procedure (a pri-
mary and then a general election) and thereby makes "the primary an integral
part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls
the choice,"' 19 Congress has power under section 4 to regulate the "Times,
Places and Manner" of holding primary elections in the several states. In sum,
the authority given Congress by section 4 "includes the authority to regulate
primary elections when, as in this case, they are a step in the exercise by the
people of their choice of representatives in Congress." °20 This regulatory power
ensues despite the absence in section 4 of any specific reference to primary
elections.
The Classic decision also identifies an additional and affirmative source of
congressional power to regulate primary elections in light of the "great purpose"
of article I, section 4.21 That source is the necessary and proper clause, which
14. Id. at 316.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17. Classic, 313 U.S. at 316.
18. Id. at 317.
19. Id. at 318.
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id. at 320.
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endows Congress with power to make "all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."' 22 By virtue of this clause, Congress has
whatever legislative power it deems "necessary and proper" to carry into execu-
tion its vested regulatory power over congressional elections under sections 2
and 4 of article I. Congressional regulations respecting such primary elections
thus reflect what Congress deems "necessary and proper" to effectuate the con-
stitutional promise of "the free choice by the people of representatives in
Congress."'23
As Justice Black wrote in Oregon v. Mitchell,2 4 citing the Classic decision,
"the power of Congress to make election regulations in national elections is aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause."'2 5 The result is that sections 2
and 4 of article I, when read in tandem with the necessary and proper clause,
consistently have been viewed by the Supreme Court as constitutional authority
for providing, by legislation,
a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and
places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting,
protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, count-
ing of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and pub-
lication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous require-
ments as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are nec-
essary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.2 6
The critical and controlling factor that emerges from the Court's broad treat-
ment of Congress' powers respecting congressional elections is that the Court
employs the same constitutional analysis-the same broad treatment of vested
congressional power-in dealing with article II, section 1. For that reason, there
is no doubt in my mind that Congress has constitutional power to enact a law,
such as proposed in the Udall Bill, to establish a nationally uniform period of
time in which to hold primaries, caucuses, and conventions, which have become
integral parts of the article II, section 1 process of choosing presidential electors.
The key Supreme Court decision in this respect is Burroughs v. United
States,27 which mirrors the later Classic decision in its constitutional analysis.
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 18; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420(1819) (adopting a broad interpretation of the federal government's authority under the necessary
and proper clause).
23. Classic, 313 U.S. at 316.
24. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
25. Id. at 120.
26. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). Section 4 of article I allots to the states the
power to regulate and prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, but section 4 then provides that "Congress may at any time
make or alter such Regulations." Id. It is from the latter provision that Congress is vested with
power to enact "a complete code for congressional elections." Id. As explained by James Madison,
state regulations might violate the principles of equality or deprive the people of the right of suffrage,
and "it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government." 3 J. ELLIOT,
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 367 (1876). Indeed, Madison indicated the intent was
to have regulations that would be "uniform throughout the continent." Id.
27. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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Burroughs dealt with an application of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
192528 to political committees organized for the purpose of improperly influenc-
ing the elections for Presidential electors in two or more states. In holding that
Congress has vested authority under article II, section 1 to regulate such prac-
tices, Burroughs rejected a narrow reading of section 1 that would have confined
congressional power to the literal language-to determining "the Time of chus-
ing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes." The Court
held that such a literal and narrow reading of section 1 was "without
warrant."'
29
Most importantly, the Burroughs Court, read this constitutional language
as vesting in Congress the power to preserve the purity of presidential and vice
presidential elections, even as to matters impugning the integrity of the election
process that might occur before the date established by Congress for "chusing
the Electors." As the Burroughs Court explained,
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The
importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to
and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be
too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital
particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, pos-
sesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to pre-
serve the departments and institutions of the general government from
impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption. 30
The Burroughs opinion concluded by stating:
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that
end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Con-
gress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to
attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they
conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the
means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congres-
sional determination alone.31
Thus, by reading article II, section 1 in conjunction with the necessary and
proper clause, the Court was able to interpret the language of section 1 as vest-
ing vast power in the Congress to preserve the integrity and the purity of the
Presidential election processes. As the Court more recently noted in Buckley v.
Valeo,32 Burroughs, along with Classic, stands for the proposition that "Con-
28. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070 (1925), re-
pealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (1948), and Pub. L. No. 92-225,
§ 405, 86 Stat. 1, 20 (1972).
29. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544.
30. Id. at 545.
31. Id. at 547-48.
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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gress has power to regulate Presidential elections and primaries."' 33
The conclusion respecting the Udall Bill is inescapable. In establishing a
uniform period of time in which to hold primaries, caucuses, and conventions,
all of which have been built into the process leading to the day set aside for
"chusing the Electors," Congress would be exercising part of its vested power
under article II, section 1 to preserve the integrity and purity of the Presidential
selection process. It is for Congress alone to determine if a shorter primary
period is appropriate or necessary to that end. It is also solely for Congress to
determine whether a few very early State primaries create a disproportionate
influence on the process leading to the ultimate election of Presidential electors.
There are, of course, ultimate constitutional limits to any act dealing with
the presidential election processes, just as there are constitutional limits to any
legislation passed by Congress. But those limits are reached only if a proposal,
such as the Udall Bill, encroaches on some area reserved by the Constitution for
action by the states, or violates some specific guarantee of individual rights, such
as those embraced by the First Amendment. Neither type of constitutional limi-
tation is involved in the Udall proposal.
By setting a nationally uniform primary period, this proposal, to use the
words of the Burroughs opinion, "is confined to situations which, if not beyond
the power of the state to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with
adequately. It in no sense invades any exclusive state power." 34 Fifty states
cannot deal adequately with the problem of establishing a nationally uniform
period for holding Presidential primaries, caucuses, and conventions.
I am aware of no First Amendment rights of speech or associations that
may be asserted as a barrier to establishing such a uniform period. Political
parties and individual voters certainly have various constitutionally protected
rights.3 5 Without detailing those rights, it is fair to say that none guarantees any
political party or voter the right to be heard at a particular time in a Presidential
primary season, or at least during an especially early part of the season that
Congress has found to be deleterious to the effective functioning of the Presiden-
tial selection process. And if there be any arguable impact on such rights, that
impact is certainly minimal and incidental.
In summary, the Udall Bill and the other three related bills before Congress
are constitutional. Enactment of these bills would represent an exercise by Con-
gress of its vested powers under article II, section 1 and under the necessary and
proper clause to preserve and protect the integrity and efficiency of the Presiden-
tial election process. The constitutional predicate of that conclusion is that the
primaries, caucuses, or conventions are conducted by the states pursuant to
some state law, practice, or other form of state action, and are thereby a part of
33. Id. at 90.
34. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544-545.
35. For a discussion of some of the constitutional restraints that states may encounter in seek-
ing to regulate political party nominating methods, see Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Consti-
tution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 213 (1984).
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the entire process that culminates in the popular selection of the President of the
United States.
